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ABSTRACT
Over the last couple of decades, the narrative of educational competitiveness and
the current climate of economic efficiency, have narrowed down the role of school-
ing and education, thus reducing their function to that of mere providers of skills
and competencies functional to neoliberal educational apparatus. Neoliberal educa-
tional agenda, on the one hand, and the spreading Right-wing populism, on the oth-
er, grip education and schooling in a kind of claws maneuver that put at risk priceless
educational features, such as students’ capacity to autonoumously set one’s aims and
purposes, democratic attitude, and the primacy of the common good. In such a land-
scape, it is enough clear how a democratic and critical education is cornered.
Nonetheless, room for alternative narratives remain. In my paper, by analysing
Deweyan oeuvre, I wish to offer an interpretation of education and schooling far re-
moved from the failures of both neoliberalism and populism. Deweyan theory of so-
cial intelligence is, in fact, at poles with any reductive conception of education, be
such reductivism dependent on neoliberalism or populism. Particularly, Deweyan
lesson as it is expressed in Democracy and Education, goes deep into the meaning
of interrelatedness and connectedness as essential not just to democratic education,
but also to intelligence and self-formation. Otherwise stated, the Deweyan lesson
about interconnetedness, democracy, newness and education is of priceless educa-
tional value. 
A partire almeno dalla fine degli anni Novanta, l’enfasi posta dalle politiche neolib-
erali sulla competizione e l’efficienza economica ha severamente ridotto il raggio
d’azione della scuola, quasi confinandola a fabbrica di competenze funzionali a po-
litiche decise dall’alto, non sottoposte alla discussione e al controllo democratico. A
ciò va aggiunta la scalata dei recenti movimenti neo-populisti che, dal lato opposto,
erodono il ruolo dell’educazione come formazione della coscienza critica e luogo di
condivisione e costruzione del nuovo. La concomitanza di questi due movimenti
mette all’angolo ogni reale concezione di educazione critica e democratica. In que-
sto lavoro, attraverso l’analisi di parti dell’opera deweyana, chi scrive prova a
mostrare come la condivisione è il luogo nel quale non solo si forma la democrazia,
ma, più radicalmente, il luogo nel quale l’intelligenza e il sé prendono forma. In tal
senso, la lezione deweyana riguarda l’emergenza del nuovo e l’educazione demo-
cratica sono di inestimabile valore educativo. 
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Introduction
Over the last couple of decades, the narrative of educational competitiveness
(Rutkowski, 2015) and the current climate of economic efficiency (Todd, 2014),
which characterises important portions of the educational landscape worldwide,
have narrowed down the role of schooling and education, thus reducing their
function to that of mere executors of politics decided from above. Neoliberal ed-
ucational agenda, on the one hand, and the spreading Right-wing populism, on
the other, grip education and schooling in a kind of claws maneuver that put at
risk priceless educational features, such as students’ capacity to autonoumously
set one’s aims and purposes, democratic attitude, girls’ and boys’ critical agency,
reflective thinking and the primacy of the common good.
The quality of relationality between teachers and students, on the one hand,
and amongst students, on the other, are deeply affected by these two kinds of
forces that have, in a sense, colonized educational discourse and practices, rele-
gating to a residual role – if not to non-sensical discourses – any kind of logic at-
tempting to put togetherness, sharing, and critical thinking center stage (Biesta,
2010; Hogan, Sellar &Lingard, 2016; Peters, 2017).
With regard to the first problem–the rise of a neoliberal educational agenda
with its emphasis on individualization and competitivness – it should be noted
that such a “neoliberal cascade” (Connell, 2013) has pushed educational institu-
tions and processes as well as what we may call “educational subjectivities” (of
both teachers and students) toward a significant transformation (Ball & Olmedo,
2013). Such a transformation is anything but benign. It implies a lack, if not an
eclipse, of invaluable educational features such as democratic sharing among all
the actors of educational processes and practices, meaning creation, and the
possibility for newness to emerge. The failure to recognize such features and
phenomena results in an impoverished conception of education at the individu-
al and collective levels (Ball & Olmedo, 2013; Biesta, 2004, 2006, 2010; Hill, 2004).
Moreover: according to the scholars above, a significant problem of the neo-lib-
eral educational agenda is that only one vision of society and education is al-
lowed to enter the educational arena. Otherwise stated, there is no competition
between or acknowledgment of different ideas about society and education. In
this way, also the agency an critical thinking of students is put at risk, for girls and
boys, “reduced to an atomised, isolated monad in pursuit of his or her self-opti-
mising, cannot but be deprived of that common sense and ground that allows
one to stand in relation to others in the world.” (Di Paolantonio, 2016, p. 154)
Stusents, then, are pushed to constantly – and uncritically – improve their skills,
knowledge and competencies, thus dwelling in a perpetual market arena.
With regard to the second issue at stake, namely, the rise of Right-wing pop-
ulism, let me quote Peters at length:
In the US under Trump, and also in Europe with the emergence of the Alt-
right and the likes of Marie Le Pen, leader of the National Front in France,
Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Nigel Farage and the UK Independence
Party, Heinz-Christian Strache in Austria and the Vlaams Belang Party in
Belgium… Right-wing populism is on the rise. It is fiercely anti-immigration
and anti-integration, often associated with neo-Nazis and white supremacist
groups. It commonly assumes a kind of authoritarianism and anti-liberal
stance towards rights, and while it appeals to the ‘common man’ (sic) –
sometimes explicitly anti-women and anti-feminist – it paradoxically
nevertheless does not subscribe to the notion and practice of equality.
(Peters, 2017, p. 2)
Peters’ words are quite clear. Through such populism, priceless and founding
features of education and democracy are put at risk. Additionally, it has to be not-
ed that these two tendencies – neoliberalism and populism – rather than remov-
ing each other, as one would expect, reciprocally reinforces. This is so for, on the
one hand, populism grows up and thrives pursuing its narrative of major powers
and economic inequality stemming from economic globalization, while neolib-
eralism, on the other, characterises itself as the one and only bulwark against the
menace of disorder and subversion embodied by populism.
In such a landscape, it is enough clear how a democratic and critical educa-
tion is cornered. Nonetheless, if we believe with Dewey that “Life is a self-renew-
ing process through action upon the environment” (Dewey, 1930/1916, p. 2), and
that “Education, in its broadest sense, is the means of this social continuity of
life” (ibid.), a different conception of education and schooling has to be pursued.
In this paper, by drawing from Dewey’s oeuvre, and particularly from his master-
piece, Democracy and Education, I go deep into the importance of democracy,
togetherness, and newness, thus attempting to sketch out what an antidote to
these two force could be. More specifically, in my paper I wish to accomplish a
twofold task: on the one hand, I attempt to illuminate features of democracy that,
in our uncertain times, are essential to education and schooling. Deweyan work,
in this sense, may well be an effective tool to well manage “educational transfor-
mation in the globalized world” (Striano, 2009). This is so for the individualistic
lesson is challenged in advance by Dewey, who accomplishes the dismantlement
of any individualistic accounts of self, identity and intelligence. On the other
hand, I hope to unravel features of Deweyan lesson about the connection be-
tween school, democracy and education, which, otherwise, could remain hidden
or underestimated. Deweyan theory of social intelligence is at poles with any re-
ductive conception of education, be such reductivism dependent on neoliberal-
ism or populism.
The paper is framed into three sections and a conclusion. In the first section,
I explain the critical background underpinning my argument, by referring to
both Deweyan corpus and scholarly literature on the issue. In the second sec-
tion, I argue how, in order to understand both the relationship between educa-
tion and democracy, and Deweyan oeuvre, an understanding of the role newness
and uncertainty play in education is required. In the third section, I develop the
issues of democracy and connectedness as related to schooling, while singling
out the role courage plays in that “reorganization of education” (Dewey,
1930/1916, p. 161) and schooling Dewey pursued throughout his life. In the con-
clusion, I summarize my attempt.
1. Theoretical framework
From The Metaphysical Assumptions of Materialism (Dewey, 1882) to Knowing
and the Known (Dewey and Bentley, 1949), the questions of thinking and inquiry
are pivotal to Deweyan oeuvre. They are, in fact, not only the focus of several
Deweyan works but also at the intersection of Dewey’s conception of experi-
ence, education and democracy. Nevertheless, according to Johnston (2002) and
Rømer (2012), a Deweyan understanding of thinking, inquiry and reflective
thought has been victim to several simplifications. One type of reduction in-
volves considering Dewey a positivist or an advocate of individualistic ap-
proaches to education, which is ironic given that the very question of education
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in Dewey is grounded on sharing and communication (Dewey, 1930/1916, pp. 6-
7, 101-115). There is also another type of reduction of Deweyan thought that is
perhaps more subtle but likewise misleading. This reduction works by equating
the broad question of experience and thinking to the questions of “inquiry” and
“reflective thought”, thus reducing the “mind” to the production of knowledge,
experience to “intellectual experience” and human beings to inquirers. Of
course, inquiry and reflective thought are central issues to Deweyan thought,
and only by means of intelligent action can human beings grow and gain a
meaningful existence.
However, when analysing them, we must ask about their origin and function;
we must question the ground on which both inquiry and reflective thought lie
and the office they attend to. Such “genealogical work” is important to remain
faithful to the Deweyan aim, namely, to understand and leave intact “the cord
that binds experience and nature” without taking intellectual experience as pri-
mary (Dewey, 1929/1925, p. 23). 
Such “genealogical work” is important to remain faithful to the Deweyan aim,
namely, to understand and leave intact “the cord that binds experience and na-
ture” without taking – intellectual – knowledge as primary (Dewey, 1929/1925, p.
23). Thus, along with the identification of the Deweyan account of “thinking”
with “reflective thought” and “inquiry” – an identification that, as a matter of fact,
has served as the background for a significant portion of the educational re-
search on Dewey – we can say that, according to Wilshire, “there is another side
to the picture” (1993, p. 257). This is a side that is more concerned with uncertain-
ty, interconnetedness and sharing than with stability and equilibrium; that boldly
questions the amount of control over the very process of thinking, thus fore-
stalling the question of the “death of subject” (Boisvert, 1998, p. 35) as a transpar-
ent and auto-grounded centre of agency; a side that is unsettled by the “mystery,
doubt, and half-knowledge” of the world in which man lives (Dewey, 1980/1934,
p. 34) and fully aware of how in experience, “the distinct and evident are prized
[…] but […] the dark and twilight abound” (Dewey 1929/1925, p. 20); a side con-
cerned with “[t]he difficulties and tragedies of life” and which boldly states that
“the stimuli to acquiring knowledge, lie in the radical disparity of presence-in-ex-
perience and presence-in-knowing” (Dewey, 1917, p. 48, emphasis added); and
that openly speaks about “risk […,] ill-omen […and the] evil-eye”, which dwell in
our “aleatory world” (Dewey, 1929/1925, pp. 41-42).
Thus, if, according to Biesta and Burbules, Deweyan philosophy “takes action
as its most basic category” (2003, p. 9, emphasis in original), then, according to
Dewey, “[t]he distinctive characteristic of practical activity […] is the uncertainty
which attends it. Of it we are compelled to say: Act, but act at your peril” (Dewey,
1929, p. 6). Putting Biesta and Burbules’s argument into Dewey’s own words, we
may even say that the heart of even the “most basic category” of existence entails
peril. Moreover, if the key question of Deweyan pragmatism was “[w]hat shall we
do to make objects having value more secure in existence?” (Dewey, 1929, p. 43),
then we ought to recognise how, at the same time, “[t]he existential conditions
of any existence are indefinitely circumstantial” (Dewey, 1938, p. 319) because, ul-
timately, “[e]very existence is an event” (Dewey 1929/1925, p. 71).
Significantly, in the opening page of the first chapter of his masterpiece,
Democracy and Education, Dewey is adamant in stating how “[t]he living thing
may easily be crushed by superior forces [losing] its identity as a living thing”
(Dewey, 1930/1916, p. 1). Such forces, of course, confront every “living thing”;
however, it appears that Dewey places human beings in a special condition. Due
the possibility of rational thought, human beings are more exposed to failure. As
Dewey states in How We Think, “The power of thought […] opens to us the pos-
sibility of failures to which the animal, limited to instinct, cannot sink.” (Dewey,
1910, p. 19) Thus, on the one hand, Dewey recognises the unity between nature
and human beings; on the other hand, he overturns the ‘classic cosmogony’ in
which human beings are at the pinnacle of nature. Human beings, in the
Deweyan account, are the more fragile and exposed creatures of nature
This side of Deweyan oeuvre, of course, did not go unnoticed. Several schol-
ars have noted it: Garrison (1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2003, 2005), above all, who
clearly recognised that the Deweyan challenge to Cartesian metaphysics (2003)
entails a questioning of the auto-grounded subject that lies in such a meta-
physics; Alexander (1987), who analysed the relationship between art and expe-
rience and highlighted the role of “‘prereflexive’ experience in Dewey’s thought”
(p. 10); Wilshire (1993), who openly spoke about Dewey as “a tragic figure” (1993,
p. 257); and Saito (2002, 2005), who challenged the “apparently optimistic world-
view” (Saito, 2002, p. 249) that some perceive in Dewey’s work, thereby linking
Deweyan thought to “the sense of the tragic that we have lost sight of” (2002, p.
249). In a sense, we can find traces of this Deweyan side in the works of several
scholars who, although not involved in highlighting it directly, have shown how
the radical Deweyan challenge to Plato’s and Descartes’ “theoretical gaze” entails
the dismantling of any safe ground for thinking (Bernstein, 1961, 2010; Biesta,
1994, 2009, 2010; Jackson, 1994/95; Boisvert, 1998; Biesta and Burbules, 2003;
Semetsky, 2003, 2008; Margolis, 2010). In their works, the easy and misleading in-
terpretation of Dewey as the promoter of an irenic path to instruction, democrat-
ic education and knowledge is challenged, and Deweyan thought comes to light
in all its abyssal profundity. This is not to deny Deweyan faith in democracy and
knowledge, which would be senseless. Quite the opposite; this is to give full
weight to such dimension in all their deepness and complexity. Otherwise stat-
ed, democracy, inquiry and the acquisition of knowledge cannot be easily re-
duced to pre-formed techniques and standardized learning protocols.
Then, consistently to the framework above exposed, in this section I wish to
analyse this side of Dewey’s thought as related to democracy and connected-
ness. Remaining faithful to pragmatist principles, I will attempt to argue the con-
sequences of such an emphasis on the Deweyan conception of thinking, knowl-
edge, and education. My point is that Dewey, throughout his work, conducted a
systematic critique of the concept of rationality as mastery and control over the
world, control ibeing understood as a kind of algorithm or strict protocol to ap-
ply over things and experience. Rather, world, experience and things, in
Deweyan conception come into the world through ongoing sharing, interpreta-
tion, construction, activities that can only be performed when dwelling with oth-
ers in a shared environment. Such a conception, while not indulging to any kind
of lack of responsibility, puts the classroom dimension center stage. Girls and
boys, under the guidance of teachers, participate in the ongoing educational
conversation by means of their own critical agency, diversity of experiences and
thoughts. That is the “reflective subject”, namely, the subject that grounds itself
in the power of reflection, comes to be transformed by such an understanding,
for this reflection is continuosly challenged and transformed by the unpre-
dictable encounters we make throughout living.
Even the significance of democracy – certainly a pivotal issue in Deweyan
thought – has to be understood in its radical meaning, that is, as the way by
which not just the interaction amongst human beings arise, but, moreover, as the
C
o
n
n
ec
te
d
n
es
s,
 N
ew
n
es
s 
an
d
 D
em
o
cr
ac
y 
in
 S
ch
o
o
lin
g
83
way by which human the subject as such comes into the world. Along the way,
we will come to understand how uncertainty is also essential to democracy. This
is so, as I wish to argue further in more detail, for things, world and experience
are literally shaped by communication and ongoing contact with others and
more numerous and varied such contacts are, richer is the space in which mind
is shaped. Mind, in fact, in a Deweyan understanding, is something in ongoing
contact with world. And it is exactly such an ongoing contact that produces both
uncertainty and meaningfulness. With regard to the issue of mind, in The Quest
for Certainty Dewey states, 
The old center was mind knowing by means of an equipment of powers
complete within itself, and merely exercised upon an antecedent external
material equally complete in itself. The new center is indefinite interactions
taking place within a course of nature which is not fixed and complete, but
which is capable of direction to new and different results through the
mediation of intentional operations. (Dewey, 1929, pp. 290-291).
Thus, the Deweyan challenge to the Western “metaphysics of presence” (Gar-
rison, 2003, p. 356) goes straight to the core of the subject’s question. Such a
twofold critique of rationality and subject as mastery and control over the world,
rather than fueling a nihilistic/relativistic account of education, results in a rein-
forcement of education as the way to engender new meanings and new experi-
ence. Moreover: exactly “the mediation of intentional operations” through
which mind and experience are shaped comes to be the proper terrain of school-
ing and education, which should be conceived as free to establish their own
ends, outside of any economic or political pressure. Of course, this is not to say
that economy or politics should not have a stake in schooling and education, for
such an argument would make little sense. Education, in being a preparation for
society, has to be also developed through ongoing contact with the political and
economic sphere. Accordingly, curriculum should be conceived as something di-
namically interacting with the fast development of a society in all of its aspects. 
However, such an interrelatdness has not to be intended as subjugation or
dependency, for a pivotal function of education is also that of imagining and pro-
moting new models of living together. If newness is something worth to pursue,
education, following Dewey, has to be free to establish its own aims (Dewey,
1930/1916). Such a work may be performed only by also distancing from the pre-
sent moment and conditions, thus making room for what is unforseeabel from
what we are now. Of course, such a work is difficult to pin down and perhaps
even risky to pursue. Nonetheless, when made subservient to external eco-
nomics or political needs, education impoverishes and perhaps even passes
away. In what follows, I attempt to argue how risk, courage and uncertainty are
essential features of any education, which wish to achieve something beyond the
present condition.
2. Uncertainty and newness as essential for education to happen
When analysing Deweyan oeuvre, newness and uncertainty are not the first is-
sues that come to mind. This is true for almost two reasons: first, Dewey did not
systematically discuss them, as he did, for instance, for issues such as democracy,
inquiry, experience, thinking or art; second, even when analysing such issues by
extrapolating them from works devoted to develop other arguments, the two
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terms infrequently recur in Deweyan works. Nonetheless, it is my contention
that without an understanding of the role uncertainty and newness play in edu-
cation and thinking, an important part of Dewey’s endeavour remains hidden.
Specifically, we run the risk of losing sight of both the inner force structuring
learning and education, namely, “liv[ing] forward” (Dewey, 1917, p. 12) while
“pointing to the new possibilities” (Dewey, 1929, p. 312), and the risk entailed in
the very activity of thinking. As Dewey stated in Democracy and Education, “All
thinking involves a risk. Certainty cannot be guaranteed in advance. The invasion
of the unknown is of the nature of an adventure.” (Dewey, 1930/1916, p. 174) This
is because the lack of certainty, and the tension toward new possibilities entail
courage: in the face of the unknown, of an “uncertain, unstable, uncannily unsta-
ble” world (Dewey, 1929/1925, p. 43), we have no guarantee of success. Moreover:
in attempting to imagine and enact new possibilities, in pursuing new paths, we
may lose what we have already acquired, for learning and education do not work
cumulatively. 
I believe that, consistent with the Deweyan spirit, we must conceive of the
“invasion of the unknown” (Dewey, 1930/1916, p. 174) as an invasion provoked by
our decisions to stage new interactions with environment, thereby re-framing
our being “in-touch” with the world (Biesta and Burbules, 2003, p. 10): “As a mat-
ter of fact, the pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function of mind
is to project new and more complex ends - to free experience from routine and
from caprice. Not the use of thought to accomplish purposes already given ei-
ther in the mechanism of the body or in that of the existent state of society, but
the use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action, is the pragmatic lesson”
(Dewey, 1917, p. 73). To liberate and liberalise action entails moving toward the
unknown, and we can accomplish this movement by the interruption of the on-
going flow of experience. 
I believe that Dewey himself was adamant about this: 
But knowledge that is ubiquitous, all-inclusive and all-monopolizing, ceases
to have meaning in losing all context; that it does not appear to do so when
made supreme and self-sufficient is because it is literally impossible to
exclude that context of non-cognitive but experienced subject-matter which
gives what is known its import. […] When intellectual experience and its
material are taken to be primary, the cord that binds experience and nature
is cut. (Dewey, 1929/1925, p. 23). 
Here, Dewey makes two clear statements: a) intellectual experience is neither
“ontologically” primary nor it is desirable to take it as primary; and b) the import
of “what is known” is obtained from the “context of non-cognitive but experi-
enced subject-matter” – more specifically, something “experienced” and “non-
cognitive”, that is, something that underlies knowledge and gives knowledge its
import. In other words, not only does the import of knowledge exceed the
boundaries of knowledge, but the import of consciousness also springs from the
ongoing flux of experience as our being-embedded-in-the-world.
If my argument makes sense, we can understand education as the aware in-
terruption of the normal state of affairs in which we are engaged. Such a decision
can only concern something that is, literally, unpredictable. This unpredictability
does not so much involve the fact that the future is not at our disposal but the
fact that in the moment of the interruption, we decide to establish a new course
of events, namely, a new future; we make an “intentional change in direction of
events” (Dewey, 1929/1925, p. 316). We may even say that such a decision stages a
C
o
n
n
ec
te
d
n
es
s,
 N
ew
n
es
s 
an
d
 D
em
o
cr
ac
y 
in
 S
ch
o
o
lin
g
85
new beginning in our experience. In a sense, we are both fully aware of such in-
terruption and fully ignorant of its consequences.
As Dewey states, “The exercise of thought is, in the literal sense of that word,
inference; by it one thing carries us over to the idea of, and belief in, another
thing. It involves a jump, a leap, a going beyond what is surely known to some-
thing else accepted on its warrant.” (Dewey, 1910, p. 26, emphasis added). Signif-
icantly, Dewey uses the same words when speaking about the operation of infer-
ence: “Since inference goes beyond what is actually present, it involves a leap, a
jump, the propriety of which cannot be absolutely warranted in advance, no mat-
ter what precautions be taken. Its control is indirect, on the one hand, involving
the formation of habits of mind which are at once enterprising and cautious; and
on the other hand, involving the selection and arrangement of the particular
facts upon perception of which suggestion issues.” (ibid., p. 75, emphasis added)
Inference and the exercise of thought, then, are directed toward uncertainty
for the very reason that such a jump gains its meaning from its uncertainty, and,
indeed, “[t]o consider the bearing of the occurrence upon what may be, but is
not yet, is to think.” (Dewey, 1930/1916, p. 172, emphasis in original). At the very
same time, we can conceive of education as provoking what is not yet by an in-
terruption of the ongoing flow of experience (English, 2013).
Thus, when Dewey states that we may direct the course of nature to “new and
different results through the mediation of intentional operations” (Dewey, 1929,
p. 291), he does not refer to a direct and precise action on an element of the en-
vironment. Instead, he refers to the very relationship between experience and
education, a relationship that he explained in How We Think: 
Experience is not a rigid and closed thing; it is vital, and hence growing.
When dominated by the past, by custom and routine, it is often opposed to
the reasonable, the thoughtful. However, experience also includes the
reflection that sets us free from the limiting influence of sense, appetite, and
tradition. Experience may welcome and assimilate all that the most exact and
penetrating thought discovers. Indeed, the business of education might be
defined as just such an emancipation and enlargement of experience.
(Dewey, 1910, p. 156). 
Thus, on the one hand, experience, as our ongoing being-embedded-in-the-
world, is something that transcends us in the sense that we are within experience
as a part of its ongoing flow; this is why experience, in a sense, has u. On the oth-
er hand, we can break the flow, thereby marking a new beginning in the ongoing
course of events. Such a breaking, such an interruption – which, in Deweyan
terms, is “the business of education” – needs to be understood as the possibility
to engender experience because education, as thinking, “run[s] beyond what is,
as yet, actually given in experience” (Dewey, 1917, p. 186, emphasis in original). 
Again, in Democracy and Education, Dewey is even more explicit. When
speaking of inference, he states that such a pivotal means must be conceived of
as “always an invasion of the unknown, a leap from the known” (ibid., p. 186). The
term invasion is also meaningful. An invasion is something not at our disposal; it
is something we have to undergo or endure. When we are invaded by some-
thing, that something is not under our own power. Quite the opposite: it is some-
thing that disposes of us. Being invaded means the loss of self-control and self-
governance. The question is pivotal because Dewey is not speaking about affects
or desires or pain; Dewey is speaking about the intentional, rational act of infer-
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ring something. Stated differently, Dewey discloses an inescapable condition of
uncertainty at the core of human thinking. Again, I believe such an uncertainty
must be understood in terms of possibility. Not only does the very act of thinking
involve risk, but experience, too, is always more than we can understand because
“in any object of primary experience there are always potentialities which are
not explicit; any object that is overt is charged with possible consequences that
are hidden; the most overt act has factors which are not explicit.” (Dewey,
1929/1925, p. 20) 
For Dewey, then, the goal is not so much to encompass experience by think-
ing but to enlarge or engender new experience by thinking and education. Be-
cause “we live forward” (Dewey, 1917, p. 12), the engendering of experience
which education is, is an open affair. Thus, the attempt to master and encompass
education by projecting in advance its ends or outcomes is, in Dewey’s under-
standing, both inconsistent and undesirable because “education is all one with
growing; it has no end beyond itself” (Dewey, 1930/1916, p. 62) and “[g]rowing is
not something which is completed in odd moments; it is a continuous leading in-
to the future” (Dewey, 1930/1916, p. 65). Then, we may say that in any thought or
act, something radically unpredictable lies at its root. However, to be faithful to
Deweyan educational philosophy, uncertainty and danger also are the door to
creativity and the future. As Dewey states, “[T]hought […] is creative – an incur-
sion into the novel” (1930/1916, p. 186).
It is my argument that exactly such a commitment to novelty may be an anti-
dote to both the narrowing down and betrayment of education enacted by ne-
oliberal agenda and populism. When students are educated to not fear the new,
to be themselves the authors and the makers of such a novelty, any kind of sim-
plistic or narrow approach to education is displaced in advance, for new and
more comprhensive meanings are continously created and constructed. In that
peculiar space that schooling is, students, under the guidance of teachers, may
experiment and, in a sense, put in action new meanings and configurations, new
modes of interpreting, intending knowledge and society. Such is the experimen-
tal attitude underpinning schooling and education. Of course, this is not to say
that the development of knowledge and competencies should not have a part in
schooling and curriculum, which would be senseless if not irresponsible at all.
Quite the opposite: by developing knowledge and competencies, by putting
knowledge and competencies at work, new configurations of such competen-
cies may arise. This is also the sense of schooling as a laboratory in which the fu-
ture is shaped. Such a conception finds in Deweyan understanding of knowl-
edge and democracy two pillars (Bellatalla, 1999; Cambi and Striano, 2010). Dis-
cussing such pillars is the focus of the third section of my paper.
3. Democracy and the need of connectedness
In Democracy and Education, Dewey devoted a significant part of his endeavour
to develop the significance of the meaning for education. Such a discussion is re-
lated to the function of knowledge. Knowledge – that is, the result of thinking
(Dewey, 1930/1916, p. 177)  – springs from “existential conditions” (Dewey, 1938,
p. 319), as Dewey states in his monumental Logic. However, what should be not-
ed is that the human capacity for meaning-construction extends far beyond the
scientific and formal domain of knowledge (Spadafora, 2009) because such a ca-
pacity is “inexhaustible.” As Dewey states, 
C
o
n
n
ec
te
d
n
es
s,
 N
ew
n
es
s 
an
d
 D
em
o
cr
ac
y 
in
 S
ch
o
o
lin
g
87
Nothing is more striking than the difference between an activity as merely
physical and the wealth of meanings which the same activity may assume.
[…] There is no limit to the meaning which an action may come to possess.
It all depends upon the context of perceived connections in which it is
placed; the reach of imagination in realizing connections is inexhaustible.
(Dewey 1930/1916, 243, emphasis added) 
With this statement, we realise that the Deweyan emphasis is not so much on
actual meanings that are already understood and stabilised, and attention is also
not directed toward an already defined method to establish meanings – e.g., the
scientific method. Rather, Dewey emphasises the open and undefined dimen-
sion of possibility, the not-yet. Dewey calls our attention to “the wealth of mean-
ings which the same activity may assume” and to the fact that such a potentiality
for meaning has no limit, for “the reach of imagination in realizing connections
is inexhaustible,” that is, it is always beyond what we actually achieve, whatever
methods we employ. This “inexhaustible reach” is also called into question by
the Deweyan understandings of democracy, communication and society. These
understandings, as I argue in what follows, call into question the very conception
of togetherness, community and education one wishes to pursue. Then, let us
then examine the Deweyan definitions of society and democracy starting from
the lesson of Democracy and Education.
When discussing what a society is and what it is supposed to achieve, Dewey
is quick to connect society to communication: society, Dewey states, “not only
continues to exist by transmission, by communication, but it may fairly be said to
exist in transmission, in communication.” (Dewey, 1930/1916, p. 5) Thus, society,
namely, the very structure of our being-together, is always, in a sense, in evolu-
tion, crossed by uncertainty, even suspended. Because society exists only “in
transmission” and because the act of transmission is the event that occurs in-be-
tween persons, society exists only in this state of togetherness, of being-in-be-
tween, of being-in-suspension.
This is so for transmission depends not only on one’s intentions and one’s
communicative acts or only on other people’s listening and interpreting, but also
on what occurs in the ungraspable space between one’s speaking and other peo-
ple’s listening, between one’s intentions and other people’s interpreting. This
space, as Bhabha would have highlighted about ninety years after (2004), is not a
sum, a mix or a product of speaking and listening but something other, some-
thing that is unpredictable for all participants. Thus, society and being-together
stand on what can be called the suspended, generative space of transmission.
Such an understanding is reinforced by the Deweyan criterion of connected-
ness:
A being whose activities are associated with others has a social environment.
What he does and what he can do depend upon the expectations, demands,
approvals, and condemnations of others. A being connected with other
beings cannot perform his own activities without taking the activities of
others into account. For they are the indispensable conditions of the
realization of his tendencies. (Dewey, 1930/1916, p. 14) 
In this passage, Dewey simultaneously accomplishes not only the dismantle-
ment of any individualistic accounts of self, identity and intelligence but also the
fulfilment of his theory of social intelligence. What one “does” and “can do,” in
fact, depend on the dimension of connectedness: “expectations, demands, ap-
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provals, and condemnations of others” are essential to both the realisation and
the possibility of one’s actions. Accordingly, without the active presence of other
people, neither actual actions nor potential actions are possible to enact or even
conceive of. This reading, in turn, emphasises another dimension of the
Deweyan account of possibility, an account that allows Dewey to open a deep
and fecund educational terrain for two reasons. First, a) in the Deweyan account,
every individualistic approach to action and education is challenged in advance
because one’s purposes, desires, projects, and actions originate from and de-
pend on the public space that is opened by connectedness – a dimension that,
as I argue, has important educational bearings. Second, b) to the extent to which
even the very possibility of acting is dependent on the active presence of other
people and their unpredictable “expectations, demands, approvals, and con-
demnations,” possibility in connectedness becomes the central aspect of every
account of action and education that one wishes to explore and pursue. Addi-
tionally, others’ “expectations, demands, approvals, and condemnations” are un-
certain and even, in some ways, unpredictable; uncertainty and unpredictability
become central features of every account of action and education that we wish
to produce.
Otherwise stated, openness and the widening of possibility become central
features of educational situations and events; as stated above, in education, we
always have openness and possibilities – or potentiality – in connectedness.
Without sharing and living together and thus exposing oneself to other people,
possibility and potentiality are futile goals to pursue. 
And the famous definition of democracy Dewey gives works in the same di-
rection:
A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of
associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in
space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each
has to refer his own action to that of others and to consider the action of
others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking
down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men
from perceiving the full import of their activity. These more numerous and
more varied points of contact denote a greater diversity of stimuli to which
an individual has to respond; they consequently put a premium on variation
in his action. They secure a liberation of powers that remain suppressed as
long as the incitations to action are partial, as they must be in a group which
in its exclusiveness shuts out many interests. (Dewey, 1930/1916, p. 101)
Through this passage, Dewey accomplishes what may well be called a revolu-
tion in our understanding of democracy: from a form of government to a form of
living, that is, the space in which the self comes to be formed. This form of living
shapes individuals whilst providing them with the conditions to flourish and de-
velop in a thorough and continuous sharing of desires, projects, actions, and un-
derstandings. This possibility for development applies to the meaning of one’s
actions, thoughts, and desires and is always-already embedded in the living con-
ditions from which such actions, thoughts, and desires emerge. Moreover, the
Deweyan understanding of democracy is also a call for openness and possibility
because, in the end, one cannot know and forecast how a “variation” of one’s ac-
tions and “more numerous and more varied points of contact” are supposed to
conduct one’s life. This inability to predict precisely the outputs of democracy is
also why democracy, as a form of living and educating, produces uncertainty. If
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we remove this uncertainty from educational and democratic processes, we
would remove, simultaneously, the very root of democracy and education.
However, Dewey was well aware that to put at work such a conception would
be a difficult task. When writing about the profound reorganization of education
he had in mind, Dewey spends crucial words. With regard to this, let us consider
a passage from Democracy and Education, which explicitly relates courage, per-
severance and education: 
A reorganization of education so that learning takes place in connection with
the intelligent carrying forward of purposeful activities is a slow work. It can
only be accomplished piecemeal, a step at a time. But this is not a reason for
nominally accepting one educational philosophy and accommodating
ourselves in practice to another. It is a challenge to undertake the task of
reorganization courageously and to keep at it persistently. (Dewey, 1930/1916,
p. 161)
In this passage, Dewey calls for a deep and wide “reorganization of educa-
tion”, a reorganization that is both theoretical and practical, one that encompass-
es all levels of educational processes, ranging from schooling to curriculum, to
teachers’ role. From the beginning of the passage, the emphasis is put on the dif-
ficulty and the slowness of such challenging work: it is “a slow work”, one which
“can only be accomplished piecemeal, a step at a time”. A work requiring perse-
verance and, we may add, even remarkable patience in tolerating failures and
frustrations. However, at the end of the passage, Dewey puts courage as a basis
for such a work: courage has to sustain the entire movement of such a reorgani-
zation. This is true for given realities may count on a kind of silent, widespread
approval, and, moreover, on the sturdy force of routine. Otherwise stated, one
may reasonably ask why one should undertake such a challenge, because in the
end, the existence of something is, in and of itself, a sign of its efficacy. Yet, this
is not the whole story. Longevity and duration are not always connected to what
is right, nor always to efficacy. Duration may also be the arrest of that experimen-
tal attitude towards which schooling should be oriented, where experimental is
taken in its broad and deep sense, of something yet un-experienced, something
unknown – something requiring both intelligence and courage to be pursued.
Significantly, the link between courage and intelligence, on the one hand, and
courage and  persistence, on the other, is explicitly made by Dewey. The former
is put forward, again, in Democracy and Education, when Dewey calls toward the
task of “develop[ing] a courageous intelligence” (ibid., p. 373). Intelligence, in be-
ing oriented toward the future, in being deeply connected to forecasting and
imagination, has to do, by definition, with risk and uncertainty. Otherwise stated,
if schooling wish to sustain and promote intelligence, an intelligence devoted
not just to reproduction, newness and uncertainty should have a stake in the ed-
ucational process.
Conclusions
In my paper, I have attempted to argue that education and schooling, in order to
fulfill their own aim, have to be open to newness and even uncertainty. This is so
for one pivotal function of schooling is exactly the imagination of new ways and
models of living and being together. I have constructed my argument in connec-
tion to Deweyan oeuvre, focusing particularly on Democracy and Education. It is
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my contention, in fact, that the message Dewey left us in his masterpiece is even
more actual in current times, times where schooling and education run the risk
to lose their proper function under the twofold pressure of neoliberalism and
rising populism. Consistently to the aims pursued thus far, I would conclude my
attemptby quoting five Deweyan statements on growing and education that, al-
though located on different pages of Democracy and Education, they all point in
the same direction and display the same entanglement of meanings. I quote
them one-by-one and then provide my commentary. 
Since in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth,
there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education.” (p.
60) “Since growth is the characteristic of life, education is all one with
growing; it has no end beyond itself.” (p. 62) “Growing is not something
which is completed in odd moments; it is a continuous leading into the
future.” (p. 65) “[T]he result of the educative process is capacity for further
education.” (p. 79) “[T]he aim of education is to enable individuals to
continue their education or that the object and reward of learning is
continued capacity for growth. (p. 117) 
What strikes me in these passages, is that, in the end, not one definition of
growing or education is given. We are told that “there is nothing to which growth
is relative save more growth” and that “education is all one with growing.” How-
ever, we are not told what education is, what it entails, or what this coincidence
with growing causes. We find ourselves going through an ever-growing circle.
Moreover, in saying that education “has no end beyond itself” and that “the result
of the educative process is capacity for further education,” Dewey puts education
at the junction of potentiality and actualisation. Education is pure actualization,
for it “has no end beyond itself” and “it is its own end.” That is, in challenging a
long-standing tradition that sees education as a means of achieving something,
Dewey puts education at the top. It is a pure end. However, education is also an
ever-growing force that develops continuously without having a pre-defined di-
rection. Importantly, this development does not lead to something other than ed-
ucation or growth, for “in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save
more growth, there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more edu-
cation.” Growth and education have the pure possibility to expand themselves.
What this expansion causes is left open by Dewey. “Ends are, in fact, literally end-
less, forever coming into existence as new activities [that] occasion new conse-
quences. ‘Endless ends’ is a way of saying that there are no ends that is no fixed
self-enclosed finalities.” (Dewey, 1922, p. 231) Simultaneously, Dewey argues that
“[d]iversity of stimulation means novelty, and novelty means challenge to
thought” (Dewey, 1930/1916, p. 98), but what this diversity should be and how it
should be enacted and, in turn, what novelty is and entails are left unspecified. 
In conclusion, I emphasise how Dewey throughout his work constructed an
ethic of interrelatedness and openness, which shows how our educational effort,
far from being captured in preconceived frameworks, opens us to our own ever-
growing possibilities. In the leap of education, we cannot know in advance where
we will land. Moreover, to define our landing in advance runs the risk of restrict-
ing both the concept and the practice of education. For this reason, the leap of
education constitutes a move toward both loss and meaningfulness and to both
uncertainty and radical openness. The question regarding what education is and
what it entails is left radically open, for education belongs to the not-yet. C
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